Firefight at Precinct 2

We rode out about mid-morning to Khowst Provincial Headquarters, joined elements from Bravo Company, 151st Infantry, Indiana Army National Guard, and visited several sites, including Precinct 2, where, just two weeks earlier, Soldiers from the unit were in a TIC (troops in contact) that left two Taliban dead and several Americans wounded.

To view it at the most charitable, Precinct 2 is a work in progress. More severe critics might describe it as a pile of rubble. Somewhere between probably lies the truth. (Pictured: Afghans working to repair the remains of Precinct 2.)

Complicating matters, Captain Chris Crawford points out, are bureaucratic snarls over which Afghan government agency actually owns the land. If, for example, Ministry of Defense owns the space and another agency such as police (under Ministry of the Interior) improves the land, then fear is that MOD will simply demand that the improvements transfer over to their agency, leaving police to find a new site.

Dealing with such apparent trivialities in the middle of an active insurgency causes teeth-grinding frustration among Coalition and Afghani officials alike.

Precinct 2 is an example. Work is progressing - we were surprised to see almost 50 laborers and several machines pouring concrete footers, removing rubble, and constructing walls when we arrived unannounced. A tall stone wall now exists on one boundary of the property that was not yet built just a few weeks ago.

Existing buildings on the property are marked for demolition. One, puzzlingly, is an agency that deals with nomad issues, including the oxymoronic proposition of issuing national ID cards and other documentation to the Kochi people, who from ancient times have roamed unimpeded across these mountains and plains herding sheep, goats, and camels, and trading goods often across unrecognized national boundaries.

Somehow these issues will be resolved. Meanwhile, work proceeds to construct living barracks, operational space, and parking areas for Afghan Uniformed Police and their vehicles.

Soldiers pointed out a heavily-damaged, two-story small brick building at the edge of the property (see photo above). This was where at least two Taliban set up to ambush Soldiers when they arrived on a visit to Precinct 2. "They opened up on us when we dismounted from our MRAPs," explained 1SG Larry Sparks, pointing toward the building. "As we moved up to engage them we began to pick up small arms fire from back over there." He gestured in the direction of some residences a block or so distant.

It was not known whether these were additional enemy fighters, or ANA who may have been shooting at the small building also. Typical of urban fighting in this country, much of the time you never know who is shooting at whom.

Twice Sparks' people assaulted the building only to be driven back by a swarm of hand grenades that wounded two to three Soldiers. "At one point," Sparks said, ANA and AUP were firing RPGs at the building. "They were flying all over the place. Only a couple hit and didn't do much damage. Then we pulled out our AT-4s (a portable anti-tank weapon) and put two into the building. At that point we launched our final assault."

Two "stacks" of Soldiers entered the building. One from B/151, a second from a Cav unit that had been passing nearby and opportunistically joined the fight. According to the Soldiers, they had cleared the top floor and one Taliban was dead, another severely wounded. A Soldier who was involved recalled, "We were just inside the room when someone fired into the chest of one of the Taliban. He saw him move. Well, this guy had a suicide vest on and the shots detonated part of the vest. Blew us down the stairs and caused a couple of more people to get wounded. Fortunately only part of the vest exploded and nobody was killed."

The TIC at Precinct 2 is typical of what fighting in Afghanistan has become. Small groups of Taliban infiltrating urban areas and making a stand in a local strong point. TICs last for hours primarily because of restraints placed upon commanders regarding use of weapons. They are prohibited from employing the heavy weapons that would rapidly degrade an enemy strong point because of the possibility - regardless of how remote - of property damage or civilian casualties.

America is now in the position that official policy has come to accept friendly losses rather than risk harming an Afghani civilian. It is a philosophy that brings into question the validity of the entire counter-insurgency strategy.

Also dominating Coalition actions is the notion that in every instance Afghani forces must be given leadership – at least a chance to exercise the opportunity to take the lead - even if it means risking lives. We saw instances of this in Paktia and Khowst Provinces and have heard reports from other areas affirming the strategy.

Is the game worth the candle? While the strategy may be sensible from the viewpoint in distant Kabul, Washington, or Brussels, it weighs heavily on the Soldiers who are called upon ultimately to do the door-kicking and risk their lives for a theory.